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 THE IMPACT OF HONOR CODES ON ACADEMIC CHEATING WITHIN LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGES 
 
Heather M. O‟Neill 
Christian A. Pfeiffer 
Department of Business and Economics 
Ursinus College 
Collegeville, PA 19002 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Many researchers study the subject of collegiate cheating by 
focusing on demographic characteristics of cheaters at 
schools of varying sizes.  Other researchers examine 
whether collegiate honor codes can abate rampant cheating.  
A third group studies whether perceptions of what students 
believe to be cheating behaviors affects actual cheating. 
This paper incorporates previous research and develops of a 
model of academic cheating based on three sets of 
incentives - moral, social and economic – and how they 
affect self-reported cheating behaviors at liberal arts 
colleges. An on-line survey was administered to students 
from three liberal arts colleges in spring 2008.  The nearly 
700 respondents provide a robust data set with nearly half of 
the respondents coming from institutions with honor codes 
in place.  Econometric models using ordinary least squares 
highlight the determinants of cheating and whether honor 
codes are efficacious. The results will be useful in the 
national dialogue regarding college cheating. 
 
                               INTRODUCTION 
 
Academic dishonesty remains a pervasive occurrence on 
college campuses across the nation.  Analyzing the acts of 
cheating as reactions to three types of incentives – 
economic, moral and social – one can attempt to divine the 
determinants of cheating behavior.  Negative economic 
incentives, such as a higher likelihood of being caught or a 
more severe consequence of such, imply a higher marginal 
cost to cheating and therefore less cheating occurring.  
Morally speaking, students are reluctant to engage in 
academic cheating if they believe it is ethically 
unacceptable.  Additionally, if students believe cheating is 
disapproved socially and leading to shame, less cheating 
will occur.  This paper examines these three types of 
incentives and their impact on academic cheating on 
selective liberal arts college campuses. 
 
Some colleges have honor codes in place, which are 
believed to reduce the incidence of cheating.  Whether 
this is the case, is the thrust of this paper. For colleges 
entertaining the idea of the creation of an honor code, the 
answer to this question is paramount.  The creation of an 
ineffective code is useless. This paper examines how the 
effectiveness of honor codes at liberal arts colleges affects 
academic cheating behaviors. Three selective liberal arts 
colleges are investigated. They differ in their campus 
culture toward academic dishonesty by having different 
stated policies regarding academic integrity. The first 
school has a long-standing, nationally regarded honor 
code in place. The second recently introduced an honor 
code, but it is not as well entrenched in the campus 
culture. The third college is currently engaged in 
discussions to institute an honor code, although a 
documented academic standards policy is made available 
to students.  This paper seeks to quantify econometrically 
the impact of honor codes on cheating behaviors by 
concentrating on the incentives inherent in honor codes. 
 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
In 1963, Bowers administered a survey to more than five 
thousand American college and university students and 
produced a dissertation on his findings the following year.  
This breakthrough study was one of the earliest academic 
studies on college cheating behavior in America.  Later 
research by Don McCabe, professor of organization 
management at Rutgers University, took this further and 
broke student behavior down into various categories of 
cheating, examining the relative levels of increase within 
each grouping.  He found cheating on tests and 
examinations had grown from 39% in the 1963 survey to 
64% in 1990.  Also, cheating on written assignments had 
remained steady, increasing only by a single percentage 
point, from 65% to 66%.  Younger generations, however, 
had a decreased understanding of what constituted 
plagiarism and how to define cheating behavior (McCabe, 
2005).   
 
Numerous studies focus on student demographic indicators of 
cheating behaviors.  Earlier studies suggest males were more 
likely to cheat than females, but recent studies say the gap 
has narrowed if not disappeared (Becker, Ulstad, 2007; 
Jones, Bichlmeier, & Whitley, 1999; McCabe & Trevino, 
1993). Higher student GPAs have been shown to have a 
negative correlation with the cheating behaviors of college 
students (Burrus, McGoldrick, & Schuchmann, 2007; Crown 
& Spiller, 1998; Levy & Rakovski, 2007; McCabe & 
Trevino, 1993).  This has been attributed to the high cost of 
penalties associated with cheating for high performing 
students; students with high GPAs have a lot to lose if they 
are caught cheating.  Extracurricular activities such as sports 
have been shown to influence a student‟s tendency to cheat 
 (Burrus et al., 2007; Butterfield, McCabe, & Trevino, 1999).  
Sports participation understandably puts excess pressure on 
students because of the amount of time they require on a 
regular basis.  This pressure exists because there is then less 
time for student-athletes to pursue their course obligations, 
which leads to more academic cheating.  Participation in a 
fraternity or sorority has also been linked to an increased 
tendency to cheat (Burrus et al, 2007; (Butterfield, McCabe 
,& Trevino, 1999).  Older research has suggests that Greek 
organizations encourage cheating by keeping files with old 
papers, assignments, and tests for brothers/sisters to use 
(Hamalian, 1959; Drake, 1941).  More recently, however, it 
has been shown that this increased tendency to cheat comes 
more out of the social nature of these groups.  In Self Reports 
of Student Cheating: Does a Definition of Cheating Matter? 
it seems that the reasoning for this is that these organizations 
allow for the development of tightly knit friendships and 
communities and most cheating occurs between friends 
(Burrus et al, 2007).  Because Greek organizations foster 
these friendships they have been associated with higher 
incidences of cheating.   
 
Recently MBA programs have become scrutinized their 
reported cheating behavior (Mangan, 2006; Sharda, 2006).  
Graduate schools have been noted for their competitive 
nature and also for the “type A” personalities that such 
environments attract.  Competitive undergraduates apply to 
these schools and often exemplify cheating behaviors in 
graduate school at a higher rate because of their focus on 
results (Willin, 2004).  This could indicate one of two things.  
It could show that there is a significant difference in culture 
between undergraduate and graduate institutions.  At the 
same time, such results could also indicate that top 
performing students are less likely to report their cheating 
behavior in their undergraduate work, and more candid when 
they reach the graduate level.  In addition to this, there are 
also external factors that can influence graduate behavior 
such as pressure which “type A” students are willing to 
accept from a current employer or the anxiety to obtain a 
high paying job upon graduation (Sharda, 2006).       
 
Knowledge of punishment for cheating behavior can also 
form an important contextual factor in ethical decision 
making.  The severity of punishment for cheating thus 
becomes the value which a student must weigh against the 
benefits he/she will gain from not being caught.  It has been 
found that as the perceived severity of punishments increases, 
the levels of individual cheating are lower (Burrus, et al., 
2007; Butterfield, McCabe, & Trevino, 2001).  While some 
schools have protocols for students to receive an academic 
warning for cheating, others simply expel cheaters.  When 
there are no standardized repercussions for cheating and 
when current rules are not enforced, a cheating culture 
develops (Callahan, 2006).  Thus, a cheating culture absorbs 
into it a wide array of variables creating a collective 
environment that can either abate or encourage academic 
integrity.      
 
Several researchers have studied the subject of collegiate 
cheating in relation to honor codes, specifically how effective 
codes are in reducing cheating (Arnold, Martin, Jinks, Bigby, 
2007; Burrus et al, 2007; Butterfield, McCabe, Trevino, 
2001; Butterfield, McCabe, Trevino, 1999; McCabe & 
Trevino, 1993).  Their results generally indicate that for an 
honor code to witness less cheating behavior, the code must 
be well understood, respected and strongly abided by faculty 
and students, i.e., embedded in the campus culture.  McCabe 
and Trevino note three reasons why honor codes are expected 
to reduce academic dishonesty: 1) the academic integrity of 
activities are clearly delineated, 2) students‟ moral compasses 
are more likely to be aroused and 3) honor codes come with 
highly desired liberties that would be abolished if the code or 
cheating were to occur (1999).  
 
Other research links the perception of what signifies cheating 
to cheating behaviors (Bisping, Patron, Roskelley, 2008; 
Callahan, 2006; Hard, Conway, Moran, 2006; McCabe, 
Trevino, Butterfield, 2002).  Ranking activities in terms of 
their degree of cheating severity is used to show a negative 
correlation with both the frequency and likelihood of the 
activities.  For example, one of the most severe forms of 
cheating, purchasing a term paper and handing it in as one‟s 
own work, would occur very infrequently.  In comparison, if 
students believed seeking help from peers on homework was 
trivial cheating at best, greater frequency of this activity 
would be reported.   
 
                       METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
During the spring semester of 2008, a web-based survey 
was sent to the student body of three small liberal arts 
colleges.  Student participation in this survey was voluntary 
and completely anonymous.  All three colleges stress the 
importance of academic honesty on their respective websites 
and within their mission statements.  Two of the schools 
currently use honor codes that fit into Mendelez‟s definition 
of traditional honor codes (1985). Both have written pledges 
of honor that must be signed by students upon enrollment 
and students are expected to write an honor pledge on any 
graded assignment given to a professor.  The schools‟ honor 
boards comprise students who work with faculty advisors to 
ensure that code violations are adjudicated.  Both codes 
extend beyond the academic realm and into the social 
sphere, and outline acceptable conduct while on campus. 
Each school recognizes people make mistakes, thus offer 
grace periods for people to consider offensive actions and 
turn themselves in if appropriate.  Doing so can lead to 
lesser punishments.  Each school also encourages students 
who observe misconduct to confront the problem first with 
the alleged student violator, and if the issue cannot be 
resolved, to then take it to the honor board.   
  
The honor code of one school, HONCOL1, was established 
in 1896, making it one of the oldest in the US.  This code is 
voted upon each spring by all students, which enables it to 
change as the times change and clearly demonstrates the 
seriousness of purpose and credibility the code lends to the 
campus culture.  Moreover, visiting the school‟s website 
looking for the generic overview of the college leads one to 
a pronouncement of the school‟s honor code. The second 
college‟s honor code, HONCOL2, was originally initiated 
by student and faculty votes in 1976 to cover academic 
issues. It was extended to social norms in 1994.  A list of 
five common academic infractions and the definitions of 
such, including plagiarism, copying other student‟s work 
while submitting it as one‟s own, falsifying laboratory 
results, etc., are delineated for students.  The code is not 
advertised overtly on the college‟s website, although it can 
be found by using the search option, which leads one to the 
code within the academic catalog.  The third college, 
NOCOCECOL, does not have an honor code, although 
discussions regarding one have taken place, but it does list 
the school‟s statement on academic honesty while clearly 
delineating examples of academic dishonesty in the student 
handbook.  Like the second college, it takes some searching 
to find the statement on academic honesty.  According to the 
schools‟ faculty handbooks, all professors in all schools are 
expected to discuss academic honesty in the classroom and 
state policies on syllabi.  
 
Of the total 3,992 undergraduate students who received an e-
mail containing a link to the survey, 686 students participated 
for a 17% response rate.  The sample sizes at the three 
colleges varied with 312 responses from HONCOL1, 127 
responses from HONCOL2, and 247 responses from 
NOCODECOL.  The response rates were at 26.7%, 10% and 
15.7 % for HONCOL1, HONCOL2, and NOCODECOL, 
respectively.    
 
The survey comprised 61 questions intended to extract 
demographic, campus culture, perceptions of cheating and 
incidences of cheating from the students.  A matrix of fifteen 
potential cheating behaviors, drawn largely from McCabe‟s 
2003 index of academic integrity, was created (McCabe, 
Trevino, Butterfield, 2003).  Students were asked to indicate 
how often they had undertaken a particular action and the 
degree to which the perceived the action was considered 
academically dishonest.  Table One lists the fifteen 
behaviors, although question five was included as a ruse, 
since it is not considered cheating by anyone.  
 
The percent of students responding as undertaking a stated 
behavior once or more is presented in parentheses in Table 
One.  Using technology to procure answers on exam recorded 
the lowest frequency at 2.8% , followed by purchasing a 
paper or handing in someone else‟s paper as one‟s own at 
3.5%, and copying another student‟s work as one‟s own at 
4.7%.  Unauthorized use of a crib sheet, copying another 
person‟s answers on an exam, and allowing someone to copy 
one‟s own exam answers yielded percentages of 13, 14.4 and 
16.8, respectively.  Hereafter these six behaviors are referred 
to as the most egregious forms. The highest frequency 
occurred with 47.2% of students saying they had worked as a 
group when individual work was assigned. 
 
The percentage of respondents who contended a behavior 
indicated either moderate to severe cheating is in bold 
brackets in Table One.  The most egregious cheating 
behaviors are in the 90 percent and above range and they are 
the six behaviors with the lowest use frequencies as noted 
above.  Not surprisingly, there is a strong negative correlation 
(p=.72) between the percent of students cheating once or 
more and the percent who believe the action is more than 
trivially dishonest.  
 
Table Two presents descriptive statistics from the survey.  
Thirty seven percent of the respondents were male, 29% had 
an honor code in high school, and although not shown in the 
table, the respondents were fairly evenly dispersed across the 
four class years.  The percent of students participating in 
college athletics was 35%.  HONCOL1 does not have Greek 
social organizations, thus the 13% from the survey who are 
such members come from the other two schools.  Twelve 
percent are business or economics majors and 86% intend to 
go to graduate school in the future (35% for an MBA.)  
Eighty percent of the respondent‟s fathers attended college 
and 82% of their mothers did.   
 
The overall mean GPA for respondents was 3.4on a 4.0 grade 
scale with little disparity across school: HONCOL1 (3.44), 
HONCOL2 (3.43), and NOCODECOL (3.37).  This is 
roughly an A- average on the four point scale, indicating 
students with higher GPA scores were more likely to take 
survey, which may bias the results.  The average verbal and 
math SAT scores were 665 and 647, respectively. 
 
Some variables were coded as ranges.  Using midpoints of 
the ranges to establish means led to an average annual family 
income of $179,307, a mean of 5.53 hours spent working for 
pay per week and an average of 14.9 hours per week studying 
outside the classroom. Eighty three percent of those surveyed 
said the severity of consequences either fit the crime or were 
too severe, suggesting harsh punishment exists. 
 
Two cheating indices were created.  The first, egregious 
cheating frequency, concerns the aforementioned six cheating 
behaviors.  Students who do not engage in a behavior are 
given a value of zero, whereas those saying they have 
engaged in it once or more are given a score of 1.  The sum 
of these six dummy variables per student forms the egregious 
cheating frequency.  Its mean is .55, suggesting less than one 
of the egregious forms is undertaken on average.  In fact, 
71% indicated they did not engage in any of the six, 15% 
 admitted to one of the infractions, and 12% accounted for 2-3 
misconducts. Only eighteen students reported 4-6 
occurrences.   The second index is more encompassing, using 
the summation of dummy variable scores for the fourteen 
behaviors.  The mean is 3.26 with 20% reporting no instances 
of cheating, and 15% reporting engagement in one or two 
forms.  Fifteen percent admitted to 6 or more forms of 
cheating at least once or more from the fourteen listed 
activities.  The mean of 3.26 implies very little cheating, akin 
to cheating in just three of fourteen categories.  As one can 
see, both indices are skewed right, reiterating relatively few 
reported instances of cheating per student. 
 
Likewise, two cheating perception indices were created, each 
measuring whether students perceive activities to be no, 
trivial, moderate or severe forms of cheating.  These answers 
are scored 0-3, respectively. A maximum score of 42 is 
conceivable if a student states all fourteen conducts are 
severe forms of cheating.  The minimum score of zero would 
occur for any student who did not believe any activities 
denote cheating.  The cheating perception index yielded a 
mean of 30.28 with a minimum of seven and maximum of 
22.  The mean suggests an average between trivial and 
moderate cheating for the fourteen categories.  The egregious 
cheating perception index for the six noted behaviors is 
16.87, implying moderate to severe responses for the six 
activities.  Indeed, 52.5% of respondents indicated all six 
forms were severe. 
 
                   MODEL OF CHEATING BEHAVIOR 
 
Based on previous literature, college cheating is determined 
by student demographics, incentives and the existence of an 
honor code.  Equation (1) represents a multiple regression 
model for cheating with these three vectors of determinants. 
The dependent variable is a cheating index for either six or 
fourteen activities. 
.   
CHEATINDEXi = β0 + βd*DEMOGRAPHICSi + βc*INCENTIVESi 
+ βh*HONCOLt  + Єi                                        (1) 
 
 * where  i = student, t=school,  and Єi  represents the 
stochastic error 
 
Demographic Variables 
 
The right hand column of Table Two shows the expected 
sign of the coefficient in the regression model based on 
previous literature.  For example, students wishing to pursue 
an MBA are more likely to engage in cheating behavior, thus 
the positive sign.  Gender contains a question mark because 
the literature shows mixed results.  Traditionally, males have 
been more inclined to cheat, but recent literature maintains 
there is no longer a greater proclivity for males.   The 
negative sign on GPA means the higher a student‟s GPA, the 
less cheating they will undertake since the student has more 
to lose if ultimately caught.  Signs of zero appear when the 
literature has not studied the factor‟s impact on cheating. 
These can be thought of as control variables.  Lastly, 
although the literature does not address the number of hours 
worked on cheating behaviors, the expected sign is positive.  
The more hours spent working, the less time available for 
studying, thus an added pressure to find a shortcut to get 
things done. 
 
Incentive Variables 
 
Two social incentives expected to reduce cheating behavior 
are adverse reactions from parents and peers if one is caught 
cheating.  Negative social stigmas should reduce cheating.  
Conversely, if there is a sense that cheating is pervasive on a 
campus and everyone does it, there is no social stigma, and in 
fact its pervasiveness will encourage cheating so students can 
remain competitive.   The harsher the consequence of being 
caught cheating, less cheating behavior is expected, 
according to the economics of crime literature.  Morally, if 
one perceives an act as cheating, one‟s moral compass would 
lead one to cheat less.  The signs on the two cheating 
perception indices are therefore negative. 
 
Honor Code Presence 
 
While the above variables‟ impacts on cheating are 
interesting, the most salient question we raise concerns the 
impact of an honor code on cheating, ceteris paribus.  Rather 
than using the existence of an honor code as a single dummy 
variable in the regression equation, the schools are entered 
separately. HONCOL1 embraces and advertises it code, and 
its code is nationally renowned.  HONCOL2 is the dummy 
variable for the second code school.  The same rigor and 
enthusiasm is not apparent in the second honor code college, 
thus the desire to separate their inclusion. Differences in 
projected reductions in cheating behaviors relative to the 
non-honor-code college can be examined. 
 
                                      RESULTS 
 
Two models using ordinary least squares were estimated, as 
shown in Table Three.  Model One estimates the cheating 
index for all fourteen activities.  Due to missing values, the 
sample size fell to 607.  The statistically significant 
demographic factors are having an honor code in high school, 
a quadratic form of GPA, and the intention of attending an 
MBA program in the future.  According to the predicted 
quadratic results for GPAs suggests increases in GPAs above 
2.15 reduce the cheating index. Being an athlete, male or a 
member of a Greek organization has no effect on the index. 
 
Peer of parental disappointment do not affect cheating 
behavior, contrary to expectations.  Although these two 
social norms are not significant, the third one is.  If students 
believe cheating is rampant and everyone does it, they too 
 will cheat.  This occurs holding other factors constant, 
including attending an honor code college.  The severity of 
punishment is also not significant in Model One. 
 
Our attention is focused on two of the independent variables: 
honor code and the cheating perception index.  The predicted 
impact on the cheating index is statistically significantly less 
for the college with the renowned honor code relative to the 
non-code school.  Coming from that honor code school, 
ceteris paribus, suggests a 1.18 point decrease in the index, 
which is quantitatively large relative to the index mean of 
3.22.  On the other hand, there is no statistically significant 
difference in the index for the second code school relative to 
the non-code school.  The perception index is also highly 
statistically significant in Model One, implying the greater 
the severity of a behaviors being considered cheating, the 
lower the cheating index.  For Model One, the impact is a 
predicted decrease of .18 or a 5.5% drop from the mean.    
 
Model Two concentrates on the six most egregious forms of 
cheating and the results differ in some cases from Model 
One. Being male, having a lower GPA, the intention of 
obtaining an MBA and being an athlete are associated with 
higher egregious cheating behaviors.   Adverse parental 
reaction is now statistically significant with a predicted drop 
in the index of .195, while the other social norm of “Every 
One Does It” remains a strong instigator to cheating. 
 
Model Two‟s results regarding cheating perception and honor 
codes reiterate Model One‟s findings.  The quantitative 
impact from HONCOL1 is even greater, a .249 predicted 
decline in the cheating index relative to the mean of .55.  The 
perception index is only built from the six cheating behaviors 
in Model Two.  A unit increase in the index is expected to 
decrease egregious cheating behavior by .135 points, which 
represents 24.5% decline from the mean. 
 
                                    CONCLUSION     
 
Preliminary results from this rich data set provide initial 
evidence that perceptions of the severity of academic 
cheating behaviors and the existence of honor codes play a 
role in academic dishonesty at liberal arts colleges.  
Specifically, the more severe a student perceives an academic 
cheating behavior to be, the less cheating behavior will be 
undertaken.  This is true regardless of whether the college has 
an honor code or not.  This suggests schools can reduce 
cheating behavior through actions that raise awareness of 
what constitutes cheating.  
 
Having an honor code, in and of itself, is not sufficient to 
thwart cheating. Unless the code is embedded and embraced 
by the college community, a code will not rectify cheating.  
Again, it is incumbent upon schools with honor codes to 
elevate them to a level wherein the faculty, students and 
administration revere them.  Schools entertaining the idea to 
institute a code need to be mindful of this connection. 
 
Given the self-reported nature of cheating behaviors, the 
element of measurement error is real.  Simply put, cheaters 
are liars, suggesting cheating behaviors are underreported.  If 
they are, however, underreported across all campuses, the 
bias is not as bad.  Self selection of who responded to the 
survey can also bias results, but fixing that problem is not 
possible.  Both of these data issues affected other researchers, 
so at least we are all comparing one set of biased results to 
another with similar biases.   
 
Lastly, the study would benefit by having more colleges 
involved in it.  Originally, ten schools within the same 
athletic conference were approached to allow the on-line 
survey to be administered anonymously.  These schools are 
similar in many ways and compete for the many of the same 
students.  Unfortunately, only three colleges were willing to 
participate.  While extremely grateful to those schools, we 
find it upsetting that others were unwilling to have their 
students represented.  For some school administrators, there 
seemed to be a fear of what the results might show.  Leading 
without sufficient information is not generally the road to 
success.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 Table One 
 Behavior    (percent doing once or more)    [percent who believe it’s moderate or serious cheating]  
Q1 Doing less than your fair share of work on a group project   (28.4%)         [21.3%] 
Q2 Fabricating or falsifying a bibliography, lab, or research data   (27.1%)     [69.1] 
Q3 Paraphrasing a few lines from an online or print source without citing it (40.2%)  [65.6%] 
Q4 
Purchasing or obtaining a paper either online or from someone else and turning it in as your 
own   (3.5%)   [99.8%] 
Q5 Marking all the same letter when answering Scantron multiple choice examination questions 
Q6 Copying homework from another student   (41.4%)    [70.7%]   
Q7 Seeking help from other students in your class on a take home exam (28.1%)  [78.9%] 
Q8 Working as a group when individual work is assigned   (47.2%)   [51.9%]   
Q9 
Working with someone over e-mail or instant messaging on an individual assignment (31.9%)  
[49.6%] 
Q10 Copy and pasting another student‟s work and turning it in as your own   (4.7%)    [98.2%] 
Q11 Using text messaging or other technology to get answers on test information    (2.8%)    [99%]    
Q12 Copying off of another student during a test or examination    (14.4%)    [98.2%] 
Q13 Allowing someone to copy your answers during a test or examination   (16.8%)   [99%]    
Q14 
Using crib notes (unauthorized by a professor) to answer test or examination questions  (13%)  
[92.9] 
Q15 Using a false excuse to get an extension on a paper or other class assignment   (27%)   [60.1%] 
 
        
 
  
                                                       Table Two  
Demographic Variables  N Mean  Std. Dev. Min   Max 
H0 
GENDER 686 0.37 0.48 0 1 
? 
HIGH SCHOOL HONOR CODE 686 0.29 0.45 0 1 
+ 
GPA 660 3.4 0.45 0 4 
- 
SAT VERBAL 663 665 96 0 800 
0 
SAT MATH 668 647 98 0 800 
0 
MBA INTENTION 686 0.25 0.43 0 1 
+ 
GRAD SCHOOL INTENTION 686 .86 0.34 0 1 
0 
COLLEGE ATHLETE 684 0.35 0.48 0 1 
+ 
GREEK MEMBER 684 0.13 0.33 0 1 
+ 
DAD COLLEGE 686 .80 0.39 0 1 
0 
MOM COLLEGE 686 .82 0.38 0 1 
0 
FAMILY INCOME 650 179,307 176,685 25,000 750,000 
0 
WORK FOR PAY HOURS/WEEK 686 6.51 5.53 2.5 28 
+ 
Moral,  Social and Economic 
Incentives 
 
BAD PARENT REACTION 686 0.79 0.41 0 1 
 
 
 
- 
BAD PEER REACTION 686 0.42 0.49 0 1 
- 
EVERY ONE DOES IT 686 0.25 0.43 0 1 
+ 
HARSH PUNISHMENT 686 0.83 0.38 0 1 
- 
ALL  14 CHEATING PERCEPTION 633 30.28 5.65 7 42 
- 
EGREGIOUS SIX PERCEPTION 667 16.87 1.85 1 18 
- 
Dependent Variables      
 
ALL  14 CHEATING BEHAVIORS 686 3.26 2.96 0 14 
 
EGREGIOUS SIX CHEATING 
FREQUENCY 686 0.55 0.12 0 6 
 
 
  
                                                                 Table Three 
        MODEL ONE                          MODEL TWO 
Dependent Variable= CHEAT INDEX 14                           Dependent Variable= CHEAT INDEX 6 
Dependent Mean=3.22                                           Dependent Mean=.55 
Adjusted R
2
=.379   N=607                                       Adjusted R
2
=.175   N=641 
 
Variable           Estimate    Pr > |t|         Estimate    Pr > |t| 
 
INTERCEPT         7.891       <.0001            2.766     <.0001 
HONCOL2                         0.267       0.3807          -0.067       0.5642 
HONCOL1                        -1.183       0.0001         -0.249       0.0288 
GENDER               0.149        0.4439            0.290       0.0006 
HS CODE             -0.355       0.0845                          0.304       0.0014 
ATHLETE             0.190        0.3278             0.168     0.1069 
GREEK                  0.097       0.7405             0.042       0.7423 
PERCEPTION INDEX  -0.182       <.0001           -0.135       <.0001  
BAD PARENT REACT  -0.004       0.9376           -0.195       0.0606 
BAD PEER REACT    -0.205       0.3604            0.005       0.9621 
EVERY ONE DOES     0.586        0.0122             0.197       0.0551 
HARSH PUNISH      -0.259       0.2849           -0.099       0.3590  
WORK FOR PAY    0.026        0.1286           0.005      0.5152 
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